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This text begins a research project concerning those thinkers who associate the discussion about 
the possibility of thinking about God with the problem of difference. The main question of these 
considerations is this: How does God appear on the differentiated horizon, while torn by difference 
always conceived in a defined manner? If difference is inevitably inscribed in thought, then how is 
God inscribed in difference? These questions lead to another: How does difference rule in reflec-
tion on divinity? In other words: How far does the way that difference is conceived affect how we 
reflect upon the deity? When looking for answers to these questions we take the first step towards 
Heidegger. Owing to the special status of ontological difference and the trace it leaves on think-
ing “on the horizon” of difference, it is with this that we begin movement toward differentiation 
as such. The question about God and the difference in Heidegger’s thought in this text takes the 
following form: How does God appear in a sphere divided by the difference between Being and 
beings? How does ontological difference mark the conception of God?
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In his lecture titled “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” Martin Hei-
degger poses a famous question whose significance reinforces its impact: How does 
God appear in philosophy?1 The persisting allure of inquiring into “what is higher 
than all else,” tied to the power contained in the response proclaiming an ultimate 
* The article was written as part of the “Józef Tischner – Polish Philosophy of Freedom and Eu-
ropean Thought” research project (11H 13 0471 82), financed by the Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education.
1 “We can properly think through the question, How does the deity enter into philosophy?, only when 
that to which the deity is to come has become sufficiently clear: that is, philosophy itself. (…) But assum-
ing that philosophy, as thinking, is the free and spontaneous self-involvement with beings as such, then 
the deity can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature, 
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God over the Christian one, casts a shadow (or, as some may prefer, shines a bright 
light on the horizon) upon this field known as philosophical reflection upon God. By 
the same token, the matter of how God appears in philosophy led Heidegger to ask 
how God appears in the sphere of ontological difference. The attempt to conceive of 
God in terms of a region torn by the difference between Being and beings meant that 
philosophical thought on divinity has long been tied to how we conceive of difference.
The bond between God and difference appears in philosophy through the oft-
reiterated logic of inquiry, which makes difference the fundamental question. Re-
placing ontological difference with another concept of difference,2 Jean-Luc Marion 
simultaneously formulates a conviction of “the dominant role that phenomenology 
has always assigned to difference.”3 At the same time, in awarding the question of 
difference this special status, phenomenology went beyond the horizon marked by 
ontological difference. Freed from the control of difference between Being and be-
ings, Heidegger’s question was expressed in philosophy thus: How does God appear 
on the differentiated horizon, while torn by difference always conceived in a de-
fined manner (also as ontological difference)? If difference is inevitably inscribed in 
thought, then how is God inscribed in difference? 
The question about God leads to another: How does difference rule in reflection 
on divinity? In other words: How far does the way that difference is conceived affect 
how we reflect upon the deity? Yet this logic of inquiring into divinity can be up-
ended! Taking our cue from Emmanuel Lévinas, we may ask: If there do exist divine 
powers, then how ought we conceive of difference so that “the Gods, dwelling upon 
the world’s heights, find their place in philosophical discourse”?4
The opportunity revealed in Lévinas’s question to upend the logic of inquiring 
into the place of the deity within the horizon of thought established by difference has 
special significance here. In the research project beginning with this article, I will 
less be investigating how a specific difference differs than the ways in which phi-
losophy of difference lets God appear in its realm. In asking how difference differs, 
we thus step toward the question of how differences differ. This meditation will free 
reflection on God from the reign of certain interpretations of difference (e.g. from 
ontological difference), not in order to subject it to the domain of another difference 
(e.g. agathological difference, such as we find in Józef Tischner’s philosophy), but so 
that it can operate in a space illuminated by a multiplicity of interpretations of differ-
ence. Operating in a realm of many interpretations of difference and a constant shift 
in points of view allows us to pose questions about how the leap between differences 
(into another concept of difference) modifies how God emerges in philosophy. The 
intent around various interpretations of difference also allows us to open a space for 
contemplating how various interpretations of difference affect the way we conceive 
the relationship between divinity and man and his world. 
requires and determines that and how the deity enters into it.” M. Heidegger, The Onto-theo-logical 
Constitution of Metaphysics, [in:] Identity and Difference, trans. J. Stambaugh, Chicago 1969, pp. 55–56.
2 According to Marion, “the play of call and response marks a difference without compare.” See: J.-
L. Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. J.L. Kosky, Stanford 2002, p. 295.
3 Ibidem, p. 294.
4 E. Lévinas, Proper Names, trans. M.B. Smith, Stanford 1996, p. 80.
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Reflection on divinity liberated from the influence of ontological difference still 
feels the power of its effects. Heidegger is one of many philosophers of difference, 
and yet it is generally where difference becomes a foremost subject of thought, where 
questions concerning God in philosophical discourse are preceded by a question of 
how the difference might be conceived, that we find a trace of his responses to the 
capability of conceiving God. Regardless of how accurate we find Heidegger’s onto-
theo-logical critique, or how insufficient and inconclusive we find his thinking on 
“the last God” emerging from Being, there can be no doubt that ontological differ-
ence – though it may “enclose” God (reduce the deity of God) in a horizon marked 
by Being – remains present in philosophy. Jacques Derrida stresses that his différance 
would be unthinkable without ontological difference.
Difference thus became a “thinking point.” The dominant role phenomenology 
(but also hermeneutics, structuralism, etc.) gave to difference emerges in an oft-reit-
erated double question: whence and how does difference differ? The logic of inquir-
ing into difference, passed down to us by phenomenological tradition, presupposes 
the antecedence of a question about a “place” from which difference emerges with 
regard to the question of how difference differs. In effect, the history of phenomenol-
ogy still goes into creating the ever-running debate on the originary difference – the 
one preceding all the others, “without compare.”5
I do not intend to join discussions which difference is ultimately the condition of 
the possibility of differentiation. The aim of the present paper will be to show that 
it is possible and cognitively fruitful to shift the point of gravity from questions of 
whence to questions of how difference differs, or in fact, as we shall see, to questions 
of how differences differ. This article is a first step in this direction. In submitting 
questions about the effects of raising a particular difference to the level of a differ-
ence that establishes thinking beyond the issue of origin, we are not questioning the 
importance of dispute around the location of the origin. Yet this dispute ceases to be 
of critical importance to us. 
The question of the originary difference
Let us return to the issue of the originary difference, setting aside for now our further 
considerations of how differences differ. The question of the originary difference in-
evitably contains ambiguity, held in how we conceive of origin – the metaphor of the 
“origin” can point to what is first, or what is most essential, as well as what is most 
fundamental, the condition for all else, or finally, what is closest to the truth.6 Further-
more, these various strategies of comprehending “origin” do not correspond in one 
point: we might imagine that what is most “originary” bars access to the truth seen as 
5 J.-L. Marion, op. cit., p. 295.
6 On the ambiguity of the metaphor of the source found in the framework of the phenomenology of 
source experience, see Barbara Skarga in her excellent metaphysical essays: B. Skarga, Kwintet metafizy-
czny, Kraków 2003, pp. 7–9.
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evident (as Michel Henry demonstrates) or cannot be reduced to a basic principle (as 
Derrida’s différance seems to be).
The question of where the originary difference ‘happens’ in human thought con-
tains a great deal of ambiguity. My investigations will be drawing from this concept 
of origin, which sees a condition for the possibility of difference in what is at the 
origin. The originary difference holds a special essentiality, as it is the basis of dif-
ferentiation as such. If thinking is inextricably tied to difference, conditioned by the 
necessity of separating one from the other (an x different from a y), then in delving 
into the originary difference we are exploring the condition for the possibility of dif-
ference, and thus for thinking as such. Thus, asking about the originary difference is 
revealed for us as a question about such a difference that is the basis for the existence 
of all differences that can be conceived, and furthermore, a difference that gives sig-
nificance to all others, so to speak. 
As we know, Heidegger makes the difference between Being and beings the origi-
nary difference. We should note, however, that in Sein und Zeit – a work in which Be-
ing emerges as quite different from beings (Being of beings is itself not a beings7) – 
the very concept of Being is not yet central; it is eclipsed by thoughts focused on 
the examination of beings. In his paper of 1936–38, Beiträge zur Philosophie, Hei-
degger – leaving the difference between beings and Being to reflect on the essence 
of Beyng – confirms the constant presence in his thinking of a distinction between 
what (as he says) he conceived “ever since Being and Time (…) as the ‘ontologi-
cal difference’.”8 Reflection on ontological difference is also found in his book on 
Nietzsche,9 yet it only resounds with full force in the “Onto-theo-logical Constitution 
of Metaphysics,”10 as if the attempt to reflect on difference as such and the decision 
to fix it in the center of study, allowing for difference itself to be considered in terms 
of perdurance (Austrag), required some time.
It is not insignificant that in this lecture, the question of difference is accompanied 
by the question of how God appears in philosophy. Divinity is enclosed in a hori-
zon strung between ontological difference; it “enters into philosophy through […] 
perdurance.”11 God is inscribed in ontological difference whether he is conceived in 
metaphysical terms as the Highest Being, oscillating between Being and beings, the 
cause behind every being, Being, and ultimately, even himself, or, as in Beiträge, if 
he emerges from Beyng. With this decision, the difference between beings and Being, 
embracing everything that can be thought, including God, becomes the fundamental 
difference, the one that opens the field to the thinkable, and also governs this field.
7 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Stambaugh, New York 1996, p. 9.
8 M. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), trans. R. Rojcewisz, D. Vallega-Neu, 
Bloomington 2012, p. 197. Further references to Contributions will be marked as “C.”
9 “We cannot withdraw from the differentiation of Being and beings (…) Everywhere we go we are 
continually moving on the path of the differentiation, a path that carries us from beings to Being and from 
Being to beings.” M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 4, trans. D.F. Krell, San Francisco 1987, p. 183.
10 “Thus, we think of Being rigorously only when we think of it in its difference with beings, and 
of beings in their difference with Being. The difference thus comes specifically into view [So kommt die 
Differenz eignis in den Blick],” M. Heidegger, Identity…, op. cit., p. 62.
11 Ibidem, p. 71.
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Toward the fundamental difference
The delay found in Heidegger’s thought in “introducing” God to the “space” of 
thought, divided by ontological difference and the period of time between the publi-
cation of Being and Time and Contributions to Philosophy and The Onto-theo-logical 
Constitution of Metaphysics is not insignificant. This distance is inscribed with the 
decision that makes ontological difference the fundamental difference. Addressing 
how God appears in the frame of the horizon divided by ontological difference, Hei-
degger also incorporates God into his thinking. Bringing God into the sphere of dif-
ference, he raises the originary difference to a difference structuring the horizon of 
the thinkable.12 The originary difference becomes the fundamental difference, the 
basis for all reflection, including reflection on God. The fundamental difference, 
a condition for human thought, sets out strategies of openness to the thinkable. The 
ontological difference as a fundamental difference governs the sphere of thought it 
marks off: what is given to thought, including God, must “speak” to how it situates it-
self in the horizon divided by difference, and on which side of the difference between 
beings and Being it finds its place.
The power of thought based on the fundamental difference is that it accepts the 
challenge of considering what can be thought, as if going back to the beginning and 
starting over. Thinking from within the fundamental difference gives what is conceiv-
able a new structure, allows for a new meaning to emerge, in other words, a “new 
opening,” allowing us to look differently at man, the world, and God. The above 
terms, “new opening,” structure, and new meaning, inevitably indicate the ability of 
fundamental difference to create a new order of thinking and the aspect of govern-
ance and rule, and thus, at one point, it is arche-ic (alluding to the meaning of arché 
whose trace is found in the concept of archon). The fundamental difference rules, 
structuring thought in a specific way; it is the basis that organizes the horizon of every 
particular thought, bringing order into the realm of the thinkable, not only in terms of 
particular philosophical projects, but also in the scope in which philosophical theories 
help create the shifting horizons conceiving the world, man, and divinity in European 
culture. Perhaps every religious/philosophical thought, if it is to be a thought of a cer-
tain structure, consciously or not, inevitably derives from this fundamental difference.
Reflecting on the question of whence difference differs is inscribed in the history 
of the debate over “the kingdom of difference.” It is not my intention to delve into 
whether it is worth conjuring up a few ideas (decisions) for reflection within the fun-
damental difference. Martin Buber speaks of two fundamental strategies by which 
man opens to the world: one is the relationship of the I-Thou bond, and the other the 
12 Ontological difference has this status even though the leap into the essence of Beyng (Seyn) de-
scribed in Beiträge, which requires a man to leap into his essence changing in history (Da-sein), modi-
fies its gravity, shifting the stress onto the difference between man in his present state and his essential 
being. Without a leap into man’s essence (Da-sein) Being, despite its distinction from beings, is still 
seen as united with beings. Yet the leap does not annihilate or question the gravity of the ontological 
difference as such. I have analyzed this issue elsewhere. See: K. Mech, Logos wiary. Między boskością 
a racjonalnością, Kraków 2008, pp. 351–353.
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objectifying I-It relationship. Paul Tillich, in turn, makes the originary fact that gives 
importance to all others the passage to the essence, allowing beings to exist, and 
bearing an aspect of duty, grounding what exists to existence, facticity conceived as 
a state of decline, an alienation from the essence. Meanwhile, Michel Henry makes 
the fundamental difference between originary phenomenality, an internal process of 
self-experience of absolute life (life experienced in immanence), by which I am given 
to myself, and externality, to which not only the external world belongs, but also 
makes up the content of my intentional experiences. We ought also to mention the 
internal difference of Jean-Luc Nancy (much closer to Derrida’s différance), which is 
a “fracture” of meaning prior to the speech that articulates it. 
We should mention once more Jean-Luc Marion’s distinction between the call 
that comes from one who gives and the response of a man who allows the giver to 
appear in a certain shape. I would also like to recall the agathological difference of 
Krakow philosopher Józef Tischner, who, separating good and evil, places what ex-
ists in the “light” of the undefined horizon of goodness. Other thinkers’ decisions “on 
difference” have led them to discover an originary difference they have elevated to 
a fundamental difference, confirming the dominant role given to difference in phe-
nomenology (and beyond).
We want to free how we think about divinity from the rule of every concrete in-
terpretation of fundamental difference. Searching for how differences differ presup-
poses the possibility of going beyond every interpretation of difference that permits 
thought. Yet the movement that allows us to go beyond a concrete difference cannot 
escape from what was transcended in that movement. This means that the search for 
how differences differ makes concrete difference its point of departure, and at the 
same time makes every inquiry into the fundamental difference subordinate to the 
possibility it can be transcended.
Back to … ontological difference and the question of Being
Owing to the special status of ontological difference and the trace it leaves on thinking 
“on the horizon” of difference, it is with this we begin movement toward differentia-
tion as such. We ask once more: How does God appear in a sphere divided by the 
difference between Being and beings? How does ontological difference mark our con-
ception of God? Without lingering on analyses of the God of metaphysics conceived 
as the Supreme Being, we shall inquire into Heidegger’s ultimate God, the “highest 
instance of withholding.” Asking how God emerges from Being not only sends us to 
what is differentiated by difference, but above all, to differentiation as such.
Ontological difference divides and distinguishes between being(s), and thus, what 
is “available first-hand” to man, and Being, which facilitates this accessibility of be-
ings. Through difference, beings and Being are “set apart from each other, separated, 
and nonetheless connected to each other.”13 Ontological difference, differentiating 
13 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 4, p. 155.
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beings and Being, does not do this without giving them a connection. This is an es-
sential moment in Heidegger’s understanding of difference. Ontological difference is 
not absolute in the sense of absoluteness that beings and Being are so far untied/sev-
ered, that a “yawning chasm” of indifference opens up between them, best expressed 
by the concept of radical or absolute alienation.14 The power of differentiation is not 
exhausted in its capacity to untie, to sever beings from Being; ontological difference 
establishes a link between what has been divided; it holds the possibility of sending 
Being toward beings. In sending itself, Being gives itself (Es gibt) to beings. What 
does it mean that Being gives itself? In giving itself, Being allows beings to continue; 
through Being, a beings are permitted to presence (Anwesen als Anwesenlassen), and 
being essential means lasting (Wesen heist Wahren). Beings are grounded in Being, 
the ontological difference separates Being, at the core of beings, from beings, which 
are grounded in Being. 
But this is not where it ends. In giving beings lastingness, Being allows them to 
be beings for man. Through Being, beings last, becoming something that stands op-
posite man. Beings can emerge in their Being opposed only because Being opens the 
horizon of conceivability before man. From this point of view, Being can be identi-
fied with man’s openness: it is the very openness of Dasein to what can be revealed. 
The horizon of conceivability could not be open without speech; being only be-
comes revealed to man with the speech that names it. Yet inquiring into the speech 
that names beings sends us again toward Being, or more precisely, to the links be-
tween speech and Being. Why? Because Being does not only give beings lastingness, 
but also sends itself to man as logos.15 Logos belongs to Being; it can be heard and 
spoken by man. This means the place where meaning is born is not exclusively man, 
but Being. Only in man can the logos of Being speak up. The link between Being and 
thinking and the naming of Being will return in our reflections when we delve into 
the bond between man and God. The meaning of Being speaks up in man and reveals 
itself through man. Moreover, speech, being a gift belonging to the horizon of open-
ness, permits beings to “show themselves to be seen.” 
In sum, we might say that through Being, which gives itself as a logos of Being, 
speech is possible, and with man’s speech it becomes possible to describe, judge, and 
finally, search for reasons. Being gives beings lastingness (a foundation), depict-ion 
and divisibility. 
Inquiring into ontological difference is not, therefore, merely about what is di-
vided by difference; it is also a question about the “place” where Being “transvers-
es” onto beings. There is no “space” between Being and beings that might separate 
one from the other, but “Being is presenced (…) as it transverses onto beings.” One 
would like to say that what comes from Being transforms into what departs toward 
beings; to use language with religious undertones, it is a conversion of Being into be-
ings. Heidegger calls the “place” in which Being converts into beings the perdurance 
(Austrag).
14 On the distinction between radical and absolute alienation, see: B. Waldenfels, Topografia obcego, 
trans. J. Sidorek Warszawa 2002.
15 On this point, see: K. Mech, Logos wiary, op. cit., pp. 328–330.
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The perdurance, “dividing” Being and beings, has the nature of a fundamental 
resolution, which simultaneously introduces their differentiation. And yet, though 
Being and beings are differentiated/severed, they do not fall apart; one transverses 
the other. Perdurance severs them so that “transversing and descent hold together.” 
The etymology of Austrag points toward this moment of transversing, sending Being 
toward beings, and yet holding together. Austrag alludes to the word tragen, meaning 
transfer, carrying, supplying, and resolution. Acknowledging perdurance to be the 
place between Being and beings, as well as the transversing of Being onto beings, 
Heidegger says: “Being in the sense of unconcealing overwhelming, and beings as 
such in the sense of arrival that keeps itself concealed, are present, and thus differ-
entiated, by virtue of the Same, the differentiation.”16 Perdurance is the place where 
Being and beings are differentiated and united – perdurance joins Being and beings, 
preventing beings from transversing Being.
Being’s transversing onto beings does not leave Being intact. With this transvers-
ing Being conceals itself, and with it, the ontological difference conceals itself. Marion 
goes so far as to claim that, in giving itself to beings, Being vanishes, self-destructs – 
“giving the nothingness of beings, it gives no less than Being itself.”17 Thought, which 
makes beings a subject of thought, forgets about Being, and forgetting about Being, 
forgets about ontological difference. Forgetting about difference is not strictly a hu-
man weakness: it is grounded in the way in which Being arrives. It is because the 
vanishing of Being occurs that Being, in giving itself to beings, conceals itself at the 
same time, and the forgetting of Being becomes a constant possibility of thought. 
Ontological difference and the first question of God
It should not escape our attention that perdurance, as a place of Being transversing 
onto beings, is like a bridge that goes only one way. Being which is given to beings is 
incapable of “returning to itself.” Yet let us inquire into the possibility of moving in 
the opposite direction. Is it possible for beings to overwhelm Being, and if so, under 
what conditions? And also – when is it not possible? What does difference forbid, 
lest it be forgotten?
Let us begin with the latter question. The prohibition concerns God, how He was 
conceived by metaphysics, as the most presencing entity, and also the cause of Being. 
We now approach the issue of the metaphysical grounding of Being by the God of 
metaphysics. Such an attempt to ground Being changes how we conceive of perdur-
ance. Forgetting the impossibility of the Supreme Being transversing the other side 
of the difference results in the creation of metaphysics as onto-theology. A deeper 
discussion of Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology goes beyond the scope of our 
discussion, and I have attempted it elsewhere.18 We shall content ourselves by say-
16 M. Heidegger, Identity…, op. cit., p. 65.
17 J.-L. Marion, op. cit., p. 54.
18 On this point, see: K. Mech, Logos wiary, pp. 340–342.
Accepted, unedited articles published online and citable. 
The final edited and typeset version of record will appear in future
269
ing that onto-theology, acknowledging God to be the Supreme Entity, and also the 
cause of Being, incidentally presupposes that that it is possible to move from (the 
Supreme) Being to being. And thus, metaphysical thought, seeking to make Being in 
God comprehensible as a cause of Being, forgets ontological difference. Perdurance, 
the bridge for crossing one way, allowing Being to arrive at being, also prevents their 
intermingling, their limitless hopping from one side of difference to the other. 
Metaphysics – acknowledging God as the cause of Being – is caught in a bind: on 
the one hand, it conceives of perdurance as “the seat of the essence of the difference 
between Being and beings” (C, 88), and on the other, as a place where Being and be-
ings orbit one another, grounding each other. Being is the foundation for beings, and 
God, the most presencing entity, the cause of Being. In other words, “the fact that 
Being has withdrawn from beings, and beings have first of all (through Christianity) 
become mere things made by another being. The Supreme Being, as cause of all be-
ings, took over the essence of Beyng. These beings, formerly made by a creator God, 
then became the dominion of humanity, inasmuch as beings are now taken only in 
their objectivity” (C, 88). 
Forgetting difference holds other consequences. The path from being to Being is 
forbidden, and the attempt to cross it through God, conceived as the Supreme Entity, 
gives rise to crisis of metaphysics. This crisis leads to the realm of metaphysics being 
ruled by such a God who is foreign to man. Heidegger is often quoted as saying the 
God of metaphysics conceived as a causa sui is a God to which one may not pray; 
one cannot make sacrifices and dance before Him. The way in which philosophy 
has conceived of God predetermines his link with man. In reducing God to the most 
presencing being (entity), metaphysics divorces him from man. 
Yet why does the bond between man and God break down? This question engen-
ders another: Why is the God of metaphysics, the most presencing entity, so alien to 
man? It is not because the God of metaphysics is unlike the punishing and sometimes 
consoling God of religious faith? And, finally, who is man to experience the misery of 
alienation? The answers to these questions are hidden in the place where Heidegger 
situates man and God (unlike the God of metaphysics, and unlike the Christian God) 
on the horizon divided by the ontological difference. 
The question of God, once again
The basic resolution concerning how God and man are conceived in the framework 
of the space divided by ontological difference first leads us toward how man is con-
ceived. Man is a being, but his “native land” is not among beings, but in the realm 
of Being. Belonging to Being, he is called to abandon being, to cross the ontological 
difference and place himself on the path of inventively thinking (Er-denken) Being 
(Sein) in its very “core,” where there lies the essence of Beyng19 (Seyn); at the same 
19 Following the conventional translations of Heidegger, Being (Sein) in contrast with beings is writ-
ten with a capital letter, while Beyng (Seyn), or its essence, is written with a “y.”
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time, an “encounter” with God is possible. God and man (the essence of man, though 
not the present man experiencing the misery of being abandoned by Beyng) situate 
themselves on the same side of the ontological difference: they emerge from the es-
sence of Beyng (Seyn); “Beyng: the ap-propriation [Er-eignung], reached in strife, 
toward the en-counter [Ent-gegnung] of gods and humans” (C, 381).
In the realm of Beyng (Seyn) the en-counter (Er-eignung) of the proximity of God 
and man is possible insofar as man locates himself near the eventuating, historically 
changing truth of Beyng, where the arrival of God is possible. 
Whence comes the thought of Beyng? 
Yet what is the meaning of Heidegger’s thesis that God and man have to be conceived 
on the horizon of ontological difference as emerging from Being and belonging to 
it? We return to the issue of the possibility of crossing from beings to Being. A being 
who makes a leap into Beyng is a man. Here is “the uniqueness of that being, the hu-
man being” (C, 237), who is the only being capable of inventive thinking of Being. 
How does this occur? The bridge that is perdurance now leads from beings to Being, 
opening before thought capable of “inventive thinking of the truth of Beyng (Seyn)” 
(C, 45). Thus, thinking is possible which, untainted, according to the “law” of perdur-
ance, crosses ontological difference in both directions. What is thinking that can leap 
into an event of the presencing truth of Beyng? We should stress that our response 
will not be confined to how human thinking finds its place in the realm of Beyng. 
Inventive thinking of Beyng also marks out the path leading to the place where man 
will mentally “experience” the proximity of God emerging from Beyng. In other 
words, spending time near the place of the arrival of God is possible in a horizon that 
is open and marked by the inventive thinking of the truth of Beyng. 
What, then, is such thinking, whence does it come and to where does it strive? Let 
us begin with whence this thinking comes whose task is to reach the truth of Beyng. 
Heidegger’s diagnosis is all too familiar: the present man experiences the misery of 
being abandoned by Beyng. “Humans are so dazzled by objectivity and machina-
tion that beings are already withdrawing from them; and withdrawing even more are 
Beyng and truth, wherein all beings must originally arise anew and appear strange” 
(C, 88). Becoming a stranger to Beyng, man “retains the remote proximity to Beyng 
in this foreign realm” (C, 387). The thing is, in essence we belong to Beyng; thus 
“what must eventuate is what opens being to us and places us back into being and in 
that way brings us to ourselves” (C, 46). 
Inventive thinking holds a call (it is a response to a call) to transform thinking, 
to abandon calculating and rational thought, reducing beings to objectivity, allowing 
a being to be technically processed without limitations. This is also a call to reject 
thinking, entirely forgetting about Being and showing the grounding of beings in the 
sole realm of being.20 This is why inventive thinking of Being (Sein) in terms of the 
20 “The more exclusively thinking turns toward beings and seeks for itself a foundation that is most 
eminently (cf. Descartes and the modern era), all the more decisively does philosophy withdraw from the 
truth of Beyng” (C, 134).
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essence of Beyng (Seyn) is only the beginning of the process, merely “preparing the 
future ones” of the “last God” (C, 8). The call to liberation from “mere beings” (C, 
364) thus means evoking a transformation of thinking that allows one to turn from 
beings, leaving metaphysics and crossing (or leaping) to where the truth of Beyng is 
historically presenced. 
Inventive thinking is ‘the path toward Beyng,” and thus must reach where, Hei-
degger says, it receives its “essence from Beyng” (C, 363). Man’s leap “into the es-
sence of Beyng” (C, 6), into the event of Beyng, from which God and man may emerge 
as near one another, is also a leap into the essence of man.21 By the same token, man is 
not only capable of understanding Being (as Dasein), as Heidegger’s analyses showed 
beginning with Sein und Zeit, but is also called to leap into his essence (Da-sein). In 
Polish, not without cause, owing to its capability to unconceal the truth of Beyng, Da-
sein is rendered as “open-Being.” Heidegger says that the point is “to be appropriated 
over to the appropriating event. That is equivalent to an essential transformation of the 
human being: from ‘rational animal’ (animal rationale) to Da-sein” (C, 5). 
What is inventive thinking of Beyng?
What, then, is inventive thinking of Being beyond the fact that it is a leap into the 
essence of Beyng? How does it situate itself in the space divided by ontological dif-
ference? Firstly, inventive thinking of Beyng (Seyn) does not stop at Being (Sein) 
as it emerges from perdurance. Thinking of Being in contrast with beings is still too 
burdened with the link that occurs between Being and beings, in other words, that 
Being gives itself to beings, becoming their foundation. This thinking, asking about 
the Being of beings, is forever straying from the path leading toward the truth of 
Beyng (Seyn) embraced by Being (Sein) as a thing most general, abstract, and ulti-
mately hollow, which remains common to all beings and, parenthetically speaking, 
Heidegger defines as beingness (Seiendheit). Inventive thinking of Beyng, leaping 
past ontological difference, leaves questions concerning the Being of beings and in-
quires into the truth of Beyng in its (most originary) historically changing singular-
ity, its uniqueness as an event.22 At the same time, inquiring into the truth of Beyng, 
inventive thinking about Beyng prepares space for the arrival of the last God, “wholly 
other than past ones and especially other than the Christian one” (C, 319). 
In the chapter “Inceptual Thinking (Projection),” Heidegger states that “the inven-
tive thinking of the truth of Beyng is essentially pro-jection” (C, 45). We shall not 
21 “When the Gods and humans come into en-counter through the plight of Beyng, humans are cast 
out of their previous modern Western position. They are posited back behind themselves in completely 
other domains of determination, wherein neither animality nor rationality can occupy an essential place, 
even if the subsequent establishment of these properties in actual human beings might have its justifica-
tion” (C, 377). 
22 At any rate, we might ask how it is possible to express the singularity and uniqueness of Beyng in 
a natural language, which inevitably tends toward generality. Abandoning the attempt to create a special 
language for expressing Beyng, Heidegger does not give a satisfying response to how the singular and 
unique can be communicated in a language whose concepts are general in nature. 
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be pursuing this notion in detail.23 Suffice to say that inventive thinking is inquiring 
into and naming the concealed truth of Beyng, which, in drawing near to it, opens 
a horizon of thought and locates itself in openness. This thinking, which opens the 
horizon for the possible arrival of God, which is, as Heidegger states, “the necessity 
of meditation on oneself” (C, 40), is “asking a guiding question” (C, 366) to the truth 
of Beyng, “a leap into its essence and thereby into Beyng itself” (C, 36). 
Who are they, the lone ones capable of inventively thinking God? Asking is the “es-
sence of philosophy.” Inventively thinking Being is “the naming of the essence” (C, 
362), helping “the Gods out into Beyng” (C, 362), readying the locum of the Gods – 
all this transpires in the scope of philosophy. Philosophy is the “first and most extreme 
meditation on the truth of Beyng and on the Beyng of truth” (C, 37). On the path to 
closeness to the last God steps the philosopher who can investigate Beyng. Heidegger 
says: “neither in ‘personal’ nor in ‘massively shared’ ‘lived experience’ does the God 
still appear. The God appears uniquely in the abyssal ‘space’ of Beyng itself. All previ-
ous ‘creeds,’ ‘churches,’ and the like cannot in the least become the essential prepara-
tion for the encounter of God and the human being in the midst of Beyng” (C, 330). 
In his dialectic of the absolute spirit, Hegel puts philosophy above religion; Heidegger 
utterly discards religious faith as a path to God. Contributions holds the thesis that 
the true believers are the philosophers, but their faith is not in some God. The faith of 
philosophers is an enduring inquiry into the truth of Beyng, a trust that philosophical 
questions about the truth of Beyng make sense, that asking contains a response, and 
the consciousness that no response is final, given “once and for all.” 
This is why knowledge of Beyng is not a collection of statements, but “stead-
fastness in the question-worthiness of Beyng, and Beyng maintains its unique dig-
nity in such a way that it bestows itself seldom enough in withholding as the hidden 
event of the passing by of the decision regarding the advent or absconding of the 
Gods in beings” (C, 123). At the same time, a philosophical inquiry into Beyng is 
not a spontaneous play of liberties, but it is determined by what is asked. Heidegger 
says: “The more genuinely the way of inventive thinking is a way to Beyng, the more 
unconditionally is it determined by Beyng itself. Inventive thinking does not mean 
thinking up or arbitrarily devising; instead, it refers to that thinking which, in ques-
tioning, stands up to Beyng and challenges Beyng to attune the questioning through 
and through” (C, 69). 
Where does meditating on Beyng strive toward?
The aim of asking about and naming Beyng is marked by the idea of returning to the 
origins, to the place of the originary bond between Being and thinking. Inventive 
thinking of Beyng strives toward its own origins, to a place from where inventive 
thinking derives, where it crosses paths with Beyng and the thinking that emerges 
from it, where they are the same thing, yet differ from one another. This is a special 
23 On this matter, of special note is a work by Łukasz Kołoczek titled Być i mieć. Próba transpozycji 
projektu “Przyczynków do filozofii” Martina Heideggera, Kraków 2016. This book is a critical (and at 
times negative) point of reference for the present paper. 
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“place”: it is where a place of their identity and difference occurs, which Heidegger 
calls an event (Ereignis): “into the realm from which man and Being have already 
reached each other in their active nature,”24 they are “passed on to ownership (Zue-
ignen).” As the Contributions show, inquiring thinking of Beyng that reaches this 
place opens a “space” Between, while placing itself in an opening realm, which “con-
signs [übereignet] God to the human being by assigning [zueignet] the human being 
to God” (C, 23). In other words, the “space” Between, strung between man and God, 
is the “space” of their potentially reaching one another, where the essence of man 
(Da-sein) and God “become recognizable to one another.” This means that inven-
tive thinking of Beyng has reached a place where the “event of the nearness” of God 
and man is possible, where the question of the possibility of the last God’s arrival is 
resolved. The last God and the essence of man emerge from Beyng, the possibility of 
their “meeting”: “un-opposition and appropriation” occur in the lap of Beyng: Beyng 
as the origin “which first de-cides and ap-propriates Gods and humans.”25
What is the ultimate role thinking plays in preparing for the arrival of God? A long 
road leads to the place of the “meeting” between man and God, inquiringly thinking 
into the truth of God, attuning himself to traverse the open “space.” There the ques-
tion of whether God is drawing near or moving away is resolved. Inventive thinking 
of the truth of God extracts it from its concealedness, marks the path to the uncon-
cealing of the essence of Beyng. Essential thinking opening the horizon so that it 
places itself in what it has opened becomes a presencing truth of Beyng. In other 
words, inventively thinking the truth of Beyng, projecting oneself on what it in its 
very naming and asking opens, turns one into a presencing essence of Beyng, a place 
for unconcealing the truth of Beyng, and at the same time, a space for man and God to 
relate.26 The proximity of man and God can strictly occur “within” man’s thinking, in 
the space Between opened by thinking: here man’s thinking, so to speak, occurs as an 
epiphany of the very truth of Beyng. The thinking of the essential man (Da-sein), “the 
essential occurrence of Beyng as the event” (C, 12), is self-presencing Beyng. This 
is why Beyng and God need man, for only man can unconceal, that is, bring into the 
open the concealed truth of Beyng, and with it God which needs Beyng to be deified. 
God and human thinking are only different modes of Beyng. Through exerted 
thought a clever man on the path to inventive thinking of the truth of Beyng can 
leap into his essence; God and man can appear as different (un-opposed), and as 
co-belonging to Beyng. Using a language that tends toward metaphysics – which 
Heidegger questions, as we know – we might say that the “space” of man and God 
relating to one another (un-opposed and ap-propriated) is situated in the extreme 
24 M. Heidegger, Identity…, op. cit., p. 33. 
25 “The land that comes to be through and as the way of the inventive thinking of Beyng is the 
between which appropriates Da-sein to the God. In this appropriation, the human being and God first 
become ‘recognizable’ to each other, in their belonging to the stewardship and neededness of Beyng” 
(C, 69). 
26 “The inventive thinking of Beyng, the naming of the essence of Beyng, is nothing other than the 
venture of helping the Gods out into Beyng and making available to the human being the truth of what 
is true” (C, 362).
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immanence of the soul, where there occurs thinking liberated from the rule of thought 
focused on beings. 
The discovery of an open place for the arrival of God in the inventive thinking of 
Beyng in the immanent field encourages questions concerning the capability of the 
“event” of transcendence in immanence. Is it possible to conceive of God occurring 
in the horizon of Beyng which does not fall within the space Between opened by 
thinking of Beyng? By this I mean a God who, as more than Beyng, in his difference 
with Beyng (otherness), would go beyond Beyng and all forms of thinking tied to 
the essence of Beyng, while remaining Other, sending himself into that “space.” The 
question of the Heideggerian God contains the question of his possible transcendence. 
God from Beyng27
God and transcendence
It is time to pose questions about the last God, who occurs from Beyng. We must 
strenuously assert that the “event of Beyng” is not a place of the manifestation of 
divine Transcendence, which, going beyond Beyng, remaining external to it, would 
also send itself into the “space” Between, thus “transposing the human being” (C, 
12). The last God is not above, higher than, does not transcend Beyng, yet it does 
differ from it. Heidegger clearly states that transcendence, even when it is no longer 
conceived as the “God of Christianity” (C, 21), or in the form of “‘ideas’ or ‘value’ 
or ‘meaning,’ something for which one cannot live or die” (C, 22), and thus when “is 
understood differently” (C, 255), as transcendence (Überstieg), is a way of under-
standing that makes “the essence of Da-sein all too easily distorted by this determina-
tion” (C, 255). Heidegger’s message is clear: the essence of man and transcendence 
remain in opposition, even mutually exclude one another; transcendence conceals the 
essence of man (Da-sein). Why is that?
In seeking the reasons for Heidegger’s diagnosis, I refer to his research on tran-
scendence, published in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von 
Leibniz.28 There Heidegger conceives transcendence, first of all, epistemologically, 
as something that transcends human knowledge, conception, and so forth. Transcend-
ence (not necessarily religious) is something more than (plus quam) what man is 
capable of saying, experiencing, conceiving; it extends beyond a broad reckoning 
27 We should note that the present article does not address the relationship between God and Beyng; 
focusing on what occurs between man and God, it does not explore the emergence of God from Beyng. 
Yet even a cursory glance at this issue allows us to state that, while the last God, quite different from the 
Christian one, does not recall a personal God, a God who wants and does not want, who is a “volitive” 
center, we easily find a “personal” dimension in Heidegger’s analyses of Beyng. Beyng hides, needs 
something, sends itself, etc. This “movement” of a personal nature, which we ought not to reduce too 
easily to the metaphorical quality of Heidegger’s language, deserves a separate study. 
28 M. Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Gesamtausgabe, 
vol. 26, Frankfurt am Main 1975. This work is made up of the Marburg Lectures of 1928. In English they 
have been published as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. M. Heim, Bloomington 1984.
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of human cognitive abilities, and by the same token remains outside the immanent 
field of consciousness, the soul, spirit, and the like. Epistemological transcendence 
is based on an external (transcendence) – internal (subject) opposition, and thus, 
on a concept of the subject that presupposes a border between the subject and tran-
scendence. Yet according to Heidegger, this thinking is stuck in the “shackles” of 
the metaphysics of presence, a vision of the subject that sees him as something like 
a receptacle, a subject trapped inside its interior, yet always present for itself. Depart-
ing from the vision of the self-present, “receptacled” subject, Heidegger necessar-
ily also questions transcendence opposed to immanence thus conceived. In place of 
transcendence, self-transcending movement appears, which precedes the constitution 
of subjectivity as such. The transcending movement is “the original shaping of the 
subject”: the subject would not be himself if he did not transcend, his “articulations 
of being arise from [primal] transcendence.” 29
Secondly, transcendence can be understood as what goes beyond nature in the 
sense of the Greek fizis. If nature is a special “collection” of conditional, or, as Hei-
degger says, contingent beings, transcendence here is what is unconditioned, not of 
this world, and yet conditions this world. Transcendence with regard to the world 
is what is radically different, incommensurate. Yet here as well, transcendence is 
conceived as a “relational concept,”30 not in relation to Beyng, but in relation to con-
ditional beings (fizis), and thus remains beyond the horizon marked by inventive 
thinking of Beyng. Transcendence as stepping beyond carries a trace of what it tran-
scends; in both cases, according to Heidegger, it is conceived as standing across from 
all-transcending, excessive entity, and thus, in essence, metaphysically.
The final limit of onto-theology is thus less set by Heidegger’s critique of the God 
of metaphysics, but by this moment of reflection, in which transcendence is rejected 
as inevitably conceived in relation to beings. In other words, the limit of metaphysics 
is less marked by questioning the possibility of legitimizing the existence of God (as 
Kant did) than by questioning transcendence in any form, as external, as yardsticks 
and points of reference, as a meta with regard to the order of facticity. As Heidegger 
says: “Beyng itself bears in itself its own measure, if a measure is still needed at all” 
(C, 12). 
In short, Heidegger’s God is not a transcendental God who crosses into the realm 
of Beyng, “changing” its face. The last God, the one who, so to speak, administers 
Beyng, does not have the power within it to break open of openness like thunder from 
the clear blue sky, to reveal its true dimension, not contained in the horizon drawn by 
the openness of Beyng. 
Does the Heideggerian critique of transcendence finally resolve the issue of the 
possibility of thinking transcendence in relation to Beyng, and as such, transcendence 
which, in transcending Beyng, might not be conceived as “excessive entity” with 
regard to what it transcends? I shall leave this question unanswered. 
29 Ibidem, p. 88.
30 Ibidem, p. 161.
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Withholding and intimation 
Heidegger’s God is no transcendental God, transcending Beyng and sending himself 
toward it, and manifesting himself in the space Between opened by thinking. The last 
God belonging to Beyng and not going beyond it can emerge from a place where the 
truth of Beyng comes to be, in the frame of the open horizon enduringly supported in 
the openness by human questioning and naming Beyng. This concept of God requires 
man in order to be deified. 
Heidegger says this: it is man who opens the “space” Between, the realm of pos-
sibility of man and God relating to each other. God can reveal (or give) himself to 
man only within the limits of the openness of the open, relative to the horizon whose 
limits of openness are marked by the shape of inquiries into Beyng. This is why Hei-
degger’s God is a God “measured” to the horizon opened by man (Da-sein), which 
occurs through inventive thinking of Beyng attuned to his essence. The last God is 
the God for Da-sein.
And yet the possibility of the arrival of God in the framework of the horizon 
opened by man does not determine the matter of their possible link. Although think-
ing reaches the place where the “event of nearness” is possible, where God and man 
are entrusted to each other, the nearness of the last God is the most remote distance, 
and man’s uncertainty is a way of drawing near to what is remote. What kind of God 
is the last God, whom Heidegger calls “the highest figure of withholding”? 
I would like to call attention to two related concepts around which Heidegger’s 
idea of the last God orbits: withholding and intimation. What is an intimation? Hei-
degger says it is “the law of the last God” (C, 323), marking the intimation which 
is “denying itself in refusal” (C, 374). The last God(s), “not out of ‘religion’; not as 
objectively present; not as expedients of the human being” (C, 399), “reveals itself 
(…) in the intimation [Seine Wesung hat (…) im Wink]” (C, 325). Heidegger’s God 
reveals itself by giving an intimation, yet this is not a verbal intimation given by 
a personified God, some variant of logos, the voice of a reminder or an invitation to 
converse. The term Wink, translated as “intimation,” and its verb form as “intimate” 
(winken), means a nod, a hand gesture, a bat of the eye. Yet this is not a gesture of 
invitation; it is a trace of God’s passing by, “the passing by of the last God [Vorbeig-
ang des letzten Gott]” (C, 327). What is concealed in this play of metaphors between 
withholding and intimation? In other words, what is concealed between the last God 
passing by and giving intimations of withholding and the man summoned this time to 
“the originary turning [Kehre] in the event” (C, 323), the “leap into the appropriation 
[Ereignung]” (C, 323)? 
The misery of abandonment… once again 
Let us begin with man. The path of the originary turning that opens before us, in 
which, more than elsewhere, we feel Heidegger’s reading of the mystics, is “the 
great stillness of the most concealed self-knowledge” (C, 323). This is “the short-
est and steepest path” (C, 323), grounded in the law of “the great individuation in 
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Da-sein” and “the solitude of the sacrifice” (C, 323). The image Heidegger gives us 
is not a record of a road that has been traveled (by Heidegger or someone else, e.g. 
Hölderlin); it is more of a non-searching entitlement, a prophecy of a future time. 
On this path man must again experience the misery of abandonment by Being, now 
many-times enhanced. The experience of the “most extreme” misery of abandon-
ment means the necessity of a new return to a path leading toward the Beyng un-
derway, near the passing-by of the last God. Those who stand before the challenge 
to “find, traverse, and build the way back out of the experienced abandonment by 
being” (C, 325), Heidegger calls “on the way back”: “Without the sacrifice of these 
who take the way back [Rückwegigen], the possibility of an intimation of the last 
God would never dawn; they are the true fore-runners of the future ones [Zukünfti-
gen]” (C, 325). 
There is no need for a more detailed discussion of the Future Ones who will come 
after the arrival of the Returning Ones, waiting in “sacrificial restraint” (C, 313) to 
hear/see the “call of the extreme intimation” (C, 324), “before the passing by of the 
last God.” It is they who are “witnesses to the stillest stillness” (C, 313), his passing 
by. Suffice to say, the intimation opens “restrained awaiting” (C, 317) the messianic 
horizon of the future, demanding of the Future Ones “a long presentiment of the last 
God” (C, 325), restraint in being near the possibility of resolving “the absconding and 
nearing of the last God” (C, 313). 
God of a future time
We would like to pose one more question to Heidegger. Is the last God more than 
merely the most extreme withholding? In other words, does the intimation given by 
the last God, the highest form of withholding, fulfilling itself as extreme withholding, 
which creates “the emptiness of privation and austerity” (C, 303), fulfill itself as radi-
cal negativity, recalling the most extreme forms of negative theology, or does it con-
tain a trace of positivity? There can be no doubt of the “presence” in the intimation 
of the power of withholding. The essence of Beyng includes concealedness, which is 
the withholding of unconcealing oneself, and the last God belonging to Beyng is the 
highest figure of withholding. Radical withholding is radical concealing, a radical no 
towards thinking that strives to unconceal what is hidden, so radical that withhold-
ing is, if we may use this word, absolute concealedness, “conceal[ing] what is most 
concealed” (C, 317), withholding withholding itself. 
And yet Heidegger, in speaking of an intimation given by the last God, speaks of 
withholding that hesitates: “the hesitant withholding is the first and highest lighting 
up of the intimation” (C, 306). He says that “in the essence of the intimation lies the 
mystery of the unity of the innermost nearing in the most extreme distance” (C, 323). 
The intimation merges withholding and hesitation. Let us look toward this “hesitat-
ing” trace of positivity the intimation contains. Let us begin with the fact that in the 
intimation God “loses Himself” in His withholding, in His no to every thought’s at-
tempt to reveal Him. Yet the intimation, the sign of a radical withholding, leaves to 
human thinking “the emptiness of privation and austerity” (C, 303). Withholding is 
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such a lack which is a “fact” of consciousness. The conscious lack becomes an empti-
ness which is not only a lack: it contains a minimum of positivity; it is “not the mere 
non-satisfaction of an expectation or wish [einer Erwartung und eines Wünschens]” 
(C, 301); it is an emptiness open to something more. 
Let us go one step further. Heidegger uses a language of internal contradic-
tions. Emptiness is the “plight of the abandonment by Being” (C, 302), but also “the 
fullness of what is still undecided” (C, 302). Thought has reached a place where it 
experiences the misery of abandonment, though it is also the misery “of the aban-
donment by being, but this as already transposed into the open and thus as related 
to the uniqueness of Beyng and to its inexhaustibility” (C, 302). Shifting into the 
open, which remains a misery that must be endured, is also a “disposition of the most 
originary belonging” (C, 302) to a place where “the concealment of that which (…) 
is called God” (C, 302) is resolved. Inevitably, we recall the words of St. Thomas that 
crown each of his five paths leading to God. 
The intimation withholds itself, hesitating, and thus “grants the possibility of 
bestowal and appropriation” (C, 303). The possibility of resolving “whether the God 
is moving away from us or toward us” (C, 302) is shifted to the future. This is why 
“sacrificial restraint” (C, 313) is expected of the Future Ones, because the possibil-
ity of the arrival of the last God, who sends the Future Ones to the future, remains 
open. The call to the Future Ones: endure where you are (Heidegger says – occupy 
it), which “makes possible a bestowal as an essential possibility” (C, 303). To the 
“experience” of abandonment by the last God belongs – I use words foreign to Hei-
degger here – a hope for the “intrusion of the absconding and nearing of the last 
God” (C, 313) open to the future. Here is the hope that the “time of Gods” will not 
pass us by, and “restraint and reticence will be the most intimate celebration of the 
last God” (C, 317). 
How to vividly express what transpires between God and man in Heidegger’s 
thought? Here is a window whose openness is limited by the shape of the frame. Man 
tries to stand as near as possible to what is outside, but is incapable of leaning out 
past the line of the window frame. Moreover, owing to the darkness outside, he can 
see nothing beyond the window. He leans toward the window and endures in wait-
ing. What for? For something that may appear in the window to be illuminated by 
the inner light. 
Conclusions
Do analyses of Heidegger’s ontological difference allow us to move from problemat-
ics focused on the question of how (a concrete) difference differs, toward a response 
to how differences differ? Yes and no. It would probably be hasty and premature to 
generalize the research devoted to ontological difference on other projects of funda-
mental difference. Yet we do not remain incapable of drawing some vital conclusions, 
which are not strictly formal in nature. 
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The most obvious conclusion that leads to the next is the following: ontological 
difference thus divides the “space” of what is thinkable (into Being and beings) so 
that the possibility of a meeting between God and man is situated where the truth of 
Beyng lies. Regardless of how much the last God withholds Himself from man, His 
possible nearness to man must be grounded in shared belonging to Beyng, and this 
is only possible when God and man find themselves on the same side of ontological 
difference. The last God does not “visit” beings: one searches for him there in vain. 
Metaphysical attempts to think God as the most existing Entity, which is the ground 
for Being, beings, and for its own self, concluded with the creation of a God of onto-
theology alien to man and the final downfall of metaphysics.
Furthermore, the possibility of man staying on the side of Being is tied to his in-
ner transformation. Man is a being who is called to abandon beings, to transcending 
the ontological difference through thought and crossing over to Beyng, where his 
essence “resides.” Man’s thinking and Beyng belong to one another, human essential 
thinking “comes near the essence of Beyng,” emerges from it. The message sent to 
man is thus as follows: the possibility of staying near to God will only be granted him 
when, freed of beings, inventively thinking the emerging essence of God, he leaps 
into his essence (Da-sein), where the arrival of the last God is possible. 
God from Beyng, and man from Beyng. God and man find themselves on the 
same side of ontological difference, where they are entrusted with the essence of 
Beyng and the essence of man. Their mutual dis-opposition and ap-propriation oc-
curs in the “space” Between, which opens on the path of the inquiring inventive 
thinking, a leap into the event of Beyng. What else is this inscribing God and man 
into the “space” divided by difference, situating God and the essence of man on the 
same side of difference? This is a question that engenders another. How does placing 
God and man on opposite sides of the “space” separated by difference alter our way 
of thinking about them?
With this question we evoke the meditations of Jean-Luc Marion, who, in place of 
ontological difference, puts the “distance of praise” on the one hand, separating man 
and his world from God, and on the other, a difference grounded in giving, between 
the call and the human response. But moving toward Marion opens a new prospect 
for research that is beyond the scope of this article. 
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